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COMMENT
EVASION AND AVOIDANCE OF FLORIDA USURY LAWS
Where the real truth is a loan of money, the wit of man cannot find
a shift to take it out of the statute.-Lord Mansfield, Floyer v. Edwards,
I Cowp. 112 (1774).
Contrary to its desire to attract capital to aid the development of the
natural resources of our state, the Florida Legislature has long maintained
an arbitrary market rate of interest, disregarding the various risk factors
of different types of loans. The investor who sought compensation corn-
niensurate with the risk employed various devices to evade or avoid the
statute's penalties and forfeitures.
An evasion is a violation of the law; an avoidance is a lawful act which
does not come within the proscription of the statute, yet accomplishes the
same end as the former. The difference in any given situation is often one
of fact and the pre-trial avoidance may be viewed as an evasion or vice-versa
by the trier of fact whose findings are not reversible unless clearly erroneous.2
While the Florida Supreme Court itself sometimes has difficulty in
distinguishing an evasion from an avoidance3 the reported cases indicate
a fairly clear line of demarcation. It is the purpose of this article to de-
scribe the coordinates of that line so that the investor may feel more secure
in his transactions in our state.
THE STATUTE
Where interest accrues without special contract, the rate is set by
statute at 6% per annm with the right to contract in writing for a lesser
or greater rate.
4
The statute describes as usurious any agreement whereby more than
10% per annum is reserved, taken, or required to be paid for the loan or
I. FLA. STAT. c. 687 (1949).
2. Hawley v. Kendall, 139 Fla. 850, 191 So. 10 (1939); Smith v. Midcoast Inv. Co.,
127 Pa. 455, 173 So. 348 (1937); Beacharn v. Car, 122 Fla. 736, 166 So. 456 (1936);
Benton v. Wilkins, 118 Fa. 491, 159 So. 518 (1.935); Corsentina v. McPherson, Ill
Fla. 616, 150 So. 609 (1933).
3. Magee v. Crown Corp., 151 Fla. 422, 10 So.2d 818 (1942) (argued four
times: at hearing, rehearing, petition for reconsideration and reconsideration); Beach v.
Kirk, 138 Fla. 80, 189 So. 263 (1939) (court split on first hearing and reversed on
rehearing); Jones v. Hammock, 131 Fla. 321, 179 So. 674 (1937) (Justice Buford dis-
sented); Richter jewelry Co. v. Schweinert, 125 Fla. 199, 169 So. 750 (1936) (Chancel-
lor's findings affirmed because court split 3-3); Corsentina v. McPherson, su pra note 2;
Benson v. First Trust & Say. Bank, 105 Fla. 135, 134 So. 493 (1931), modified, 105
Fla. 135, 150, 142 So. 887, 888 (1932), adhered to, 105 Fla. 135, 168, 145 So. 182
(1932).
4. Fj. STAT. § 687.01 (1949).
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forbearance of money." Future payments of interest are not enforceable"
and double the amount of interest reserved or taken is forfeited.7 Instru-
ments may provide for reasonable attorney's fees, charge for exchange or
other similar charge." Mortgagees may collect premiums for insurance
actually issued on mortgaged property." The parties may provide for rea-
sonable attorney's collection fees not exceeding 10% of the principal sum
or for such attorney's fees as the court may determine to be reasonable.10
"Any person, or the agent, officer or other representative of any person,
lending money in this state who shall willfully and knowingly charge or
accept any sum of money greater than the sum loaned and an additional
sum of money equal to 25% per annum upon the principal sum loaned,
by any contract, contrivance or device whatever, directly or indirectly, bv
way of commissions, discount, exchange, interest, pretended sale of any
article, assignment of salary or wages, inspection fees or other fees or other-
wise, shall forfeit the entire sum, both the principal and interest, to the
party charged such usurious interest, and shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and on conviction, be fined not more than $100, or be impris-
oned in the county jail not snore than 90 days""t or both.12  Forfeiture of
interest is also prescribed in case of refusal to give receipt for payments,
reflecting amount applied to interest and to principal, duly and properly
signed.13 Corporations are denied the right to interpose the defense of
usury in any action in any court in this state. Three and one-half percent
per month is permitted on loans provided the lender is licensed and the
principal sum due from any one borrower never exceeds $300.15 These are
the legislature's express provisions of the usury law; tlbeir application follows.
EvAsioNs
Bonus in addition to interest is easily the simplest evasion. Taking
two obligations, one for the money loaned with legal interest and the other
for the usurious interest, was early denounced as an evasion.163 While each
note appeared to be proper on its face. the latter note was not enforceable
since it lacked legal consideration and the interest on the first note was
forfeited because the two were part of the same transaction which called
for the repayment of the loan with interest at a usurious rate. On the other
5. FiA. STAT. § 687,02 (1949)
6. FLA. STAT. § 687.03 11949
7. FLA. STAT. § 687.04 (1949).
8. FIA. STAT. § 687.05 (1949)
9. FLA. STAT. § 687.06 (1949).
10. Ibid.
11. FLA. STAT. § 687.07 (1949).
12. FLA. STAT. § 775.06 (1949).
13. FLA. STAT. § 687.08 (1949)
14. FLA. STAT. § 612.62 (1949)
15. FLA. STAT. c. 516 (1949).
16. Mitchell v. Cotton, 3 Fla. 134 (1850); Mitchell v. Cotton, 2 Fla. 136 (1848);
Mitchell v. Dogett, 1 Fla. 356 (1847); accord, Tucker v. Fouts, 73 Fla. 1215, 76 So.
130 (1917); cf. Argintar v. Lydell, 132 Fla. 45, 180 So. 346 (1938).
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hind, a usurious contract will not taint other independent obligations be-
tween the same parties.'
7
Where the usurious interest or bonus is incorporated into the same
obligation by taking back a note exceeding the principal sum of the loan
by the amount of the bonus, the resulting instrument will appear proper
on its face. Where this veil is pierced by proper proof of the actual nature
of the transaction and it is shown that the borrower was obligated to repay
the loan at a greater interest rate than the statute permits, the forfeitures
prescribed by the statute will be enforced.'8 The same holds true where
the bonus is hidden by not paying the money over to the borrower imme-
diately or by antedating the note.' Payment of the bonus to the general
agent of the lender will have the same effect"' except where the borrower
has agreed to pay for actual services rendered to him by the agent.
21 Of
course a bonus which, when pro-rated over the term of the loan, does not
bring the interest rate above the legal maximum carries no penalty; 2 nor
does a bonus paid by a third party23 unless the borrower is in some way
liable for the whole or some part of it.
24
-Interest in advance might also be an evasion for it is treated like a
bonus and computations to determine whether the loan is usurious or not
are based on the actual principal sum received by the borrower.25
Sharing in the profits of the borrower's business venture in addition
to receiving the unconditional repayment of the loan together with legal
17. Stubblefield v. Dunlap, 148 Fla. 401, 4 So.2d 519 (1941).
18. Beacham v. Carr, 122 Fla. 736, 166 So. 456 (1936); Maxwell v. Smith, 119
Fla. 389, 161 So. 566 (1935); Carr v. Cole, 119 Fla. 260, 161 So. 392 (1935); Hopkins
v. Otto, 118 Fla. 865, 160 So. 203 (1935); Hformuth v. Dickson, 115 Fla. 790, 156
So. 127 (1934); Sherman v. Myers, 108 Fla. 129, 146 So. 213 (1933); Wilson v.
Connor, 106 Fla. 6, 142 So. 606 (1932); McCullough v. Hill, 105 Fla. 680, 133 So.
846 (1931), aff'd, 105 Fla. 680, 145 So. 259 (1933); Benson v. First Trust & Say.
Bank, 105 Fla. 135, 134 So. 493 (1931), modified, 105 Fla. 135, 150, 142 So. 887, 888
(1932), adhered to, 105 Fla. 135, 168, 145 So. 182 (1932). But cf. Maule v. Eckis,
156 Fla. 790, 24 So.2d 576 (1946); Jones v. Hammock, 131 Fla. 321, 179 So. 674
(1937); Chandler v. Kendrick, 108 Fla. 450, 146 So. 551 (1933).
19. Carr v. Cole, 119 Fla. 260, 161 So. 392 (1935); McCullough v. Hill, supra
note 18.
20. Stoutamire v. North Florida Loan Ass'n, 152 Fla. 321, 11 So.2d 570 (1943);
Richter Jewelry Co. v. Schweinert, 125 Fla. 199, 169 So. 750 (1936); Enstrom v. Dun-
ning, 124 Fla. 571, 169 So. 385 (1936); Hopkins v. Otto, 118 Fla. 865, 160 So. 203
(1935); Owens v. State, 63 Fla. 26, 34, 58 So. 125, 128 (1912). But ef. Magee v. Crown
Corp., 151 Fla. 422, 10 So.2d 818 (1942); Argintar v. Lydell, 132 Fla. 45, 180 So. 346
(1938).
21. Mason v. Cunningham, 111 Fla. 200, 149 So. 331 (1933); Benson v. First
Trust & Say. Bank, supra note 18.
22. Smith v. Midcoast Inv. Co., 127 Fla. 455, 173 So. 348 (1937).
23. Pushee v. Johnson, 123 Fla. 305, 166 So. 847 (1936).
24. Tucker v. Fouts, 73 Fla. 1215, 76 So. 130 (1917).
25. Magee v. Crown Corp., supra note 3. Hormuth v. Dickson, 115 Fla. 790, 156
So. 127 (1934); Wilson v. Conner, 106 Fla. 6, 142 So. 606 (1932); Purvis v. Frink,
57 Fla. 519, 49 So. 1023 (1909).
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interest is also dealt with as an evasion." There appears to be no reas6n
why a lender may not share in the profits in lieu of interest.
Cloaking a usurious loan as a sale with the right to repurchase was the
evasion attempted in Brown v. Banning'2 where, for a conveyance, the
grantor received $35,000, a lease back and a contract to reconvey for an
amount equal to the principal sum ($35,000) at 8% plus a bonus of
$15,000 and an indebtedness of $20,000 for attorney's fees. The original
conveyance, in the form of an absolute deed, was held to be a mortgage
and because the transaction was usurious the prescribed penalties and for-
feitures followed. Yet there appears no prohibition in law or in equity,
against parties entering into such an agreement so long as it is done in
good faith and not as a device to evade the usury statutes.
A variation on this scheme also failed where the lender took a deed
from the vendor of a $1500 piece of property, paying over $1300 and a $200
note from the true purchaser to whom he gave a contract for sale for
$2100 at $35 per month.28 Here too there appears no reason why the
speculative purchase and resale at an advanced price should be prohibited.
No doubt the factor upon which the decision hinged was the good faith
and intent of the parties. Evidently, where a transaction originates in
negotiations for a loan, any agreement other than a loan would, to say the
least, be viewed with suspicion and likely be considered an evasion. This
does not necessarily follow, however, when the investor is not a party to the
original negotiations and the proposition is first presented to him by the
borrower's agent in some bona fide formm ' (This situation will be dealt
with in the discussion of avoidances.)
PROOF
The burden of proof is on the one setting up the defense of usury 0
and must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence.,' Though it
might seem so, this is not impossible even where the lender requires the
borrower to cash the check and return to him, in currency, the bonus for
miking the loan."2  Parol evidence can be given by the parties to the trans-
action in order to show that an obligation valid on its face is in fact
usurious. :"" And equity will always look through the forni to the sub-
stance.8
4
26. Beach v. Kirk, 138 Fla. 80, 189 So. 263 (1939); Cooper v. Rothman, 63 Fla.
394, 57 So. 985 (1912). But cf. Mackey v. Thompson, 153 Fla. 210, 14 So2d 571
(1943).
27. 71 la. 208, 71 So. 327 (1916).
28. Hawley v. Kendall, 139 la. 850, 191 So. 10 (1939).
29. Corsentina v. McPherson, 111 Fi. 616, 150 So. 609 (1953).
30. Phillips v. Lindsay, 102 Fla. 935, 136 So. 666 (1931); Tucker v. l"outs, 73
Fla. 1215, 76 So. 130 (1917).
31. Benton v. Wilkins, 118 Fla. 491, 159 So. 518 (1935).
32. Enstrom v. Dunning, 124 Fla. 571, 169 So. 385 (1936).
33. Wicker v. Trust Co. of florida, 109 Fla. 411, 147 So. 586 (1933).
34. Hawley v. Kendall, supra note 28; Beachani v. Carr, 122.F1a. 736, 166 So. 456
(1936); Brown v. Banning, 71 Fla. 208, 71 So. 327 (1916). "
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PENALTIES
The Supreme Court of Florida has had occasion to remand cases be-
cause of improper computations of penalties and forfeitures. It appears
that the penalty for merely entering into an agreement for usurious interest
is that all such interest is forfeited and cannot be enforced in any court
in any kind of action-only the principal sum may be collected in law or
in equity.3" To determine the amount due, not only is the excessive interest
to be forfeited but no interest at all is to be allowed. "" On the other hand,
the penalty for actually taking usurious interest is the forfeiture of double
the amount of any bonus reserved as well as double the amount of any
interest payments paid, received, taken or cxacted. 7 This forfeiture is de-
ducted from the actual principal sum loaned38-the amount actually re-
ceived by the borrower from the lender. It is cven possible that the for-
feiture will discharge the debt-" or exceed it4" leaviug the usurer indebted
to his debtor.
QUAsI-AvoIoANcEs
Evasions which go unpenalized might properly be considered as quasi-
avoidances. Obviously, the simplest quasi-avoidance would be the usurious
loan which the borrower repays without protest out of sonic sense of moral
obligation or against the foreclosure or enforcement of which he does not
raise any defense. This is as much an evasion of the law as is passing
through a traffic stop-sign without being apprehended.
The Statute of Limitations4 ' would bar any action for forfeiture or
penalty unless brought within two years from the time the right of action
accrued. In Hagan v. Neeb42 forfeiture of double the amount reserved at
the time the note was executed as well as certain interest payments which
had been made, was not barred because the Statute of Limitations did not
begin to run until maturity of the contract. It would have been nmore
proper to support this holding on the reasoning that the forfeiture was
raised as a defense; that an action to enforce the debt would not be barred
until the Statute of Limitations had run (from the maturity of the contract);
and that the defense, based upon the usurious nature of the contract, stir-
vives as long as the action. While the defense of usury would not be
barred by the statute, any affirmative relief might be.4 3
35. Purvis v. Frink, 57 Fla. 519, 49 So. 1023 (1909); Lyle v. Wino, 45 Fla. 419,
34 So, 158 (1903).
36. Purvis v. Frink, 61 Fla. 712, 54 So. 862 (1911).
37. Maxwell v. Smith. 119 Fla. 389, 161 So. 566 (1935); Ross v. Atlas Finance
Corp., 113 FIa. 793, 152 So. 410 (1934); Ceraola v. Smith, 112 Fla. 399, 150 So. 611
(1933); Sherman v. Myers, 108 Fla. 129, 146 So. 213 (1933); Wilson v. Conner, 106
Fla. 6, 142 So. 606 (1932); Hagan v. Neeb, 105 Fla. 297, 140 So. 916 (1932); Benson
v. First Trust & Say. Bank, supra note 18.
38. ibid.
39. Carr v. Cole, 119 Fla. 260, 161 So. 392 (1935).
40. Maxwell v. Smith, supra note 37.
41. FIA. STAT. § 95.11 (6) (1949).
42. 105 Fla. 297, 140 So. 916 (1932).
43. Beekner v. L. P. Kaufman, Inc., 145 Fla. 152, 198 So. 794 (1940).
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Laches might bar the action. This was the result when, after seven
and a half years, the borrower brought an action to redeem from an ex-
tension of what was originally a usurious mortgage providing for interest
in excess of the legal maximum by $25 by reason of a $250 bonus on a
three year 8% loan of $5000.
44
Absence of intent to evade saved the investor in Maule v. EckiS4" even
though a $3500 bonus on an 18 month 6% note for $68,500 actually ex-
ceeded 10% per anum by $172. This excess was found to be due to faulty
computation on the part of the attorneys who had been instructed that
the investor wanted only 10%.
Expurgation of usury by remitting the usury and taking a new agree-
ment will also relieve the lender of any penalty or forfeiture which might
have attached to the original contract. Such an agreement will be enforced
even though it is entered into after maturity of the first obligation.4 6  Ap-
parently, abandonment of the usurious contract is viewed much the same
as a waiver of the defense even though an express waiver at the time of
making an usurious contract would probably not be enforced.
AvoIDANCES
There are transactions which yield a legal return exceeding 10% per
annum. Certain of these are more or less hazardous depending on how
closely they resemble evasions. As pointed out before, the intent and good
faith of the parties generally Will control.
47
Purchase of negotiable paper or other chose in action (except salaries
and wages46 ) would not come within the usury statutes since such a trans-
action is not a loan. It is even possible, with the aid of a third party or
broker, to employ this device to cover a loan. It seems, according to the
dissenting opinion4" in Corsentina v. McPherson,5U that this was the result
reached where a mortgage broker who was employed to procure a loan
discussed the proposition with the investor as a sale of a mortgage. After
inspection of the property which was then under construction an agreement
was reached and transmitted to the borrower: he could get $10,000 less
the brokerage for a mortgage for $12,500. To close the transaction, the
broker, the investor, the borrower and the broker's secretary met at the
broker's office where the borrower executed and delivered to the secretary
a mortgage and note made payable to her and she then and there executed
an assignment to the investor and received his check for $10,000. This
44. Jones v. Hammock, 131 Fla. 321, 179 So. 674 (1937).
45. 156 Fla. 790, 24 So,2d 576 (1946).
46. Clark v. Grey, 101 Fla. 1058, 132 So. 832 (1931).
47. Maule v. Eckis, 156 Fla. 790, 24 So.2d 576 (1946); Jones v. Hammock, supra
note 44; Clark v. Grey, supra note 46; Belden v. Gray, 5 Fla. 504 (1854), affirming
Gray v. Belden, 3 Fla. 110 (1850); Hayward v. LeBaron, 4 Fla. 404 (1852).
48. See note 11 supra.
49. See Corsentina v. McPherson, 111 Fla. 616, 150 So. 609 (1933) (dissenting
opinion).
50. 111 Fla. 616, 150 So. 609 (1933).
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crude subterfuge was not held to be an invasion although the dissenting
justice pointed out that the "incidents of the transaction were not only
sufficient to put him (the investor) on iotice, but they were sufficient to
advise him fully that the transaction reeked with usury ... .
Advance in credit price over cash price is also not considered a loan
and so the parties may legally agree on one price for cash and another on
credit12 even though the credit price far exceeds the agreed valuation of
the property53 except where used to cover a usurious loan.
5 4
Compensation for other than loan or forbearance may be taken with-
out incurring the penalties of the usury statutes. It seems perfectly proper
for the borrower to reimburse the lender for his traveling expenses incurred
in connection with the loan transaction - 5 although the court has on occasion
held to the contrary."
Application of the loan to discharge existing obligations between the
parties would also be permitted if bona fide obligations actually existed.5
The lender is also entitled to reimbursement for amounts actually expended
for property insurance, title insurance, costs of abstracts of title, taxes paid
on the mortgaged land, actual and reasonable expenses of examining and
appraising the security offered for the loan, costs incidental to closing the
transaction and reasonable attorney's fees in case of foreclosure even though,
when added to the interest provided for in the contract, they exceed the
maximum legal interest. 8  The borrower need not compensate the lender
for expenses incurred in connection with raising the money for the loan. 0
The borrower may, however, agree to pay the lender's agent for services
rendered, provided that the services for which the lender's agent is com-
pensated are not such as the lender ought to have performed or paid for
himslf. 0
Allowing the lender to be compensated by the borrower for considera-
tion other than a loan is an interesting avoidance which might readily lend
itself to cover an usurious bonus. Consider the following situation: The
investor, who has been approached for a loan, offers to buy the borrower's
property at some figure below the possible market value. This is agreed
upon because the borrower wants the money quickly. By the time the
abstract is brought to date and the transaction made ready for closing, the
picture changes-the borrower offers the lender compensation for a release
51. See note 49 supra at 617, 150 So. at 610.
52. Nelson v. Scarritt Motors, 48 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1950); Davidson v. Davis, 59
Fla. 476, 52 So. 139 (1910).
53. Stubblefield v. Dunlap, 148 Ma. 401, 4 So.2d 519 (1941).
54. Hawley v. Kendall, 139 Fla. 850, 191 So. 10 (1939).
55. Chandler v. Kendrick, 108 Fla. 450, 146 So. 551 (1933).
56. Belden v. Gray, supra note 47.
57. Maxwell v. Smith, 119 Fla. 389, 161 So. 566 (1935).
58. Crompton v. Smith, 140 Fla. 511, 192 So. 186 (1939); McGillick v. Chapman,
134 Fla. 220, 184 So. 26 (1938); Pushee v. Johnson, 123 Fla 305, 166 So. 847 (1936).
59. Stubblefield v. Dunlap, 143 Fla. 401, 4 So.2d 519 (1941).
60. Richter Jewelry Co. v. Schweinert, 125 Fa. 199, 169 So. 750 (1936).
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and the lender makes the loan originally contemplated. A situation not
too far removed from this was reviewed by the court in White v. Ladd.6'
Here the borrower's proposition originally laid before the lender was the
purchase of a piece of property to be equally divided between them, part
of the borrower's purchase money being advanced by the lender. It later
developed that the borrower wanted to acquire the entire property for him-
self and was willing to give the lender a valuable consideration for rescission
of the original agreement in addition to legal interest for a loan of enough
money with which the borrower could complete the purchase price. The
resulting note incorporated the loan and the compensation for the rescission
and the court held that the chancellor's finding was justified: the note
was not usurious.
A voluntary bonus payment by the borrower would not be usurious6
2
although such a payment would be viewed with suspicion and quite likely
would not be considered voluntary.03 A fortiori, a bonus volunteered by a
third party is not usurious. In Pushee v. Johnson"4 the bonus was paid by
the borrower's agent, a mortgage broker to whom the borrower had offered
a 10% commission to obtain a loan. To induce the lender to make this
loan the broker agreed to split his commission. This was held not usurious
since the borrower was not obligated to pay any more; it was not shown
that the broker's commission was a subterfuge; or that the agreement to
split was preconceived; or that the lender and broker conspired or otherwise
cooperated to get more than legal interest.
Compensation for loan or forbearance of other than money is not reg-
ulated by statute and any rate can be exacted. For example, requiring 57
bushels of corn in repayment for a loan of 38 bushels of corn is not within
the usury statutes.65
Computation of interest can easily be employed to increase the yield
of a loan to a rate above the legal maximum. Of course, interest in ad-
vance or on an antedated note or a post dated check will not be tolerated.66
But there is nothing improper in requiring interest to be paid semi-an-
nually67 or applying payments to interest first and allowing interest to con-
tinue on the principal until payments, taken together, exceed the interest
due and then applying the surplus towards discharging the principal.08
And while compound interest is illegal, the payment of interest on overdue
installments of interest would not necessarily constitute usury,69 even though
61. 155 Fla. 264, 19 So.2d 836 (1944).
62. Chandler v. Kendrick, 108 Fla. 450, 146 So. 551 (1933).
63. 1-lormuth v. Dickson, 115 Fla. 790, 156 So. 127 (1934).
64. 123 Fla. 305, 166 So. 847 (1936).
65. Morrison v. McKinnon, 12 Fla. 552 (1869).
66. See note 19 and 25 supra.
67. Morgan v. Mortgage Discount So., 100 Fla. 124, 129 5- 589 (1930); Vain 1
White, 68 Fla. 329, 67 So. 142 (1914); Graham v. Fitts, 53 Fla. 1046, 43 So. 512
(1907); Columbia County v. King, 13 Fla. 451 (1870).
68. tat v. Dorman, 2 Fla. 445 (1849).
69. Morgan v. Mortgage Discount Co., supra note 67; Columbia County v. King,
supra note 67.
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a 10% loan with semi-annual interest bearing interest coupons actually
might return 101/2% per annum.7
0
Conflicts of laws are resolved so as to uphold the validity of an agree-
went and the law of the forum will not be applied where it requires for-
feiture or penalty.7 1 'here a note is executed and made payable in one
state and secured by a mortgage on lands in another, it will be governed
as to the rate of interest it may bear by the laws of the former.7 2 This can
result in a forfeiture where the foreign law so provides.73 On the other
hand it would appear that making a note payable in another state, whose
maximum interest rate is higher than 10%, would effectively avoid the local
statutes, 74 provided this were done for a legitimate purpose. "
Corporate borrowers arc expressly denied the defense of usury." The
law is constitutional 77 and binding on all corporations even though organ-
ized before the statute came into effect.78 Yet, while the corporate borrower
cannot plead usury as defined by one statute,79 the small loan licensee can-
not enforce a usurious loan against a corporation if the loan is larger than
$300 and at a rate exceeding that authorized by another statute, the Small
Loan Act. 0
Acceleration and penalty clauses, incorporated as standard provisions
in most notes and mortgages, have usually been employed only for the
purpose of insuring prompt payment. In Maxwell v. Jacksonville Loan &
Improvement Co."' both clauses were employed in what the court decided
was an evasion. In this case interest in advance for the full term of the
loan was added to the principal, a 10% bonus was deducted in advance
and a 10% penalty in case of default and acceleration of the entire debt
in case of three consecutive defaults were provided for. Upon careful exam-
ination it becomes clear that the loan was not usurious when first made:
it was a 7% loan of $7300 for 10 years with equal monthly payments-the
equivalent, after deducting the 10% bonus, to a loan of $6570 (the principal
sum received by the borrower) at 10% per annum. If the borrower had
carried out his agreement, as originally contemplated, he would never have
70. Graham v. Fitts, supra note 67.
71. Mackey v. Thompson, 153 Fla. 210, 14 So.2d 571 (1943).
72. Porter Interests of Florida v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 105 Fla. 550, 141
So. 741 (1932); Thomson v. Kyle, 39 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12 (1897).
73. Porter Interests of Florida v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co.. sutira note 72.
74. Seeman v. Phila. Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1926); Junction R.R. v.
Bank of Ashland, 79 U.S. 226 (1870); Miller v. Tiffany, 68 U.S. 298 (1863).
75. Ibid.
76. See note 14 supra.
77. 759 Riverside Ave. v. Marvin, 109 Fla. 473, 147 So. 848 (1933).
78. Matlack Properties v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank, 120 Fla. 77, 162 So.
148 (1933).
79. Matlack Properties v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank, st pra note 78; Deauville
Casino Corp. v. Miami Beach Porn. Homes Corp., 112 Fla. 55, 150 So. 226 (1933);
759 Riverside Ave. v. Marvin, supra note 77; see notes 1, 14 supra.
80. Smetal Corp. v. Family Loan Co., 119 Fla. 497, 161 So. 438 (1935); see note
15 supra.
81. 45 Fla. 425, 34 So. 255 (1903).
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been obliged to pay more than the legal rate of interest. While a 10%
penalty for default in a monthly payment could not be considered liquidated
damages, since the maximum value of a loan or forbearance of money is
set by statute, it should not have been held usurious but only penal and
non-enforceable for that reason. It is difficult to understand why the de-
fault of the borrower should make an otherwise innocent lender a usurer.
The question of whether exercising the option in the acceleration
clause would change the character of the contract was raised in Benson v.
First Trust & Savings Bank.s2 The loan here involved was admittedly
usurious since the borrower, who was obligated to repay $14,000 at the end
of three years and make regular installment payments of interest at 8%
per annum, had only received $11,500. But further, the interest which was
demanded in the action, when taken together with the bonus of $2500 was
more than 25% per annum (criminal usury) for the tenn for which the
loan was permitted to run (1 year, 3 months, 20 days). After some diffi-
culty, the court reached the decision that bringing an action was not such
a demand as to charge the lender criminally. Here the court discounted
the claim for interest and saved the usurious lender from complete forfeiture
while in the Maxwell case the court refused to eliminate the unearned in-
terest from the lender's claim and the loan contract, otherwise legal, became
an usurious instrument.
The situation was further confused in Collins Ave. & Ocean Invest-
ment Co. v. Crawford83 where a $900 bonus had been retained on a 3 year,
8% loan of $19,100 and foreclosure was commenced after eight months.
The court felt that to come into equity with clean hands the lender should
have remitted such part of the bonus as was made usurious because of his
exercise of the option to foreclose.
Justice Buford, speaking for the court in Smith v. Midcoast Inv. Co.,
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lays out the rule established in a prior case 81a (where the court refused to
prorate the bonus over the shortened period) about acceleration clauses as
follows:
. . I the legal consequences of such an arrangement must be tested
by the results contemplated by the parties on the assumption that
both lender and borrower will fully carry out their agreement rather
than the results which may follow, but are not necessarily certain
to ensue, when the borrower breaches a covenant which accelerates
the maturity of the principal at the option of the lender."
In the immediately following paragraph he goes on to say:
... So, we are committed (in the instant case) to the rule that if a
negotiable note and mortgage are executed payable over a period of
82. See note 3 supra.
83. 114 Fla. 469. 154 So. 211 (1934).
84. 127 Fla. 455, 173 So. 348 (1937).
84a. Benson v. First Trust and Say. Bank, sup~ra note 3.
85. See note 84 supra, at 459, 173 So. at 350.
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years, and are given to secure a loan for an amount less than the
principal expressed in the note and mortgage and the note and
mortgage are allowed to run for the full period named therein, any
bonus or deduction reserved by the lender at the time of making
the loan will be prorated over the full term of the loan, but if the
note and mortgage contain an acceleration clause of which the lender
takes advantage, then the bonus or excess will be prorated only over
the period of time for which the lender has elected to allow the
obligation to run. (Emphasis added.)
The pre-payment penalty clause which requires the payment of a min-
imum compensation without regard to the actual time for which the loan
was outstanding, has not been ruled on by the court. There is no reason
why the lender should be required to accept repayment of his money before
the agreed term expires. It, therefore, appears perfectly legal to require
additional compensation, not for the loan but for the release before the
time agreed upon. Nor should it make any difference whether this com-
pensation were liquidated in advance or at the time of the tender and offer
to redeem. However, in the light of the cases last discussed8 the courts
might easily decide that these sums were penal or even usurious, except
that the equities are different: we deal not with the overburdened bor-
rower but with the mortgagor who has accumulated sufficient funds and
is prepared to pay off his lender even before the time required.
From this review of the Florida statute and cases it becomes apparent
that any transaction which involves more than a 10% per annum return
on an investment is subject to attack. Any fact situation can be considered
non-usurious or, just as easily, a subterfuge to evade the usury laws, for, sub
silentio, great weight is given to the equities of the case.
A modem, stream-lined usury statute and a modern, stream-lined cor-
poration statute"t would be two of the most important factors in stimu-
lating the full development of the natural resources of this state. Capital
and industry could be attracted from other fields which are no more lucra-
tive-and surely no more fertile-if Florida could offer the investor and
entrepreneur greater security and promote confidence in the stability of
the law.
HERMAN I. BRETAN
86. See notes 81 and 84 supra.
87. See Wright, Past and Present Trends in Corporation Law: Is Florida in Step?,
2 MIlAMI L. Q. 69 (1947).
